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Location Verification Systems for VANETs in
Rician Fading Channels
Shihao Yan, Robert Malaney, Ido Nevat, and Gareth W. Peters
Abstract—In this work we propose and examine Location
Verification Systems (LVSs) for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
(VANETs) in the realistic setting of Rician fading channels. In our
LVSs, a single authorized Base Station (BS) equipped with multi-
ple antennas aims to detect a malicious vehicle that is spoofing its
claimed location. We first determine the optimal attack strategy
of the malicious vehicle, which in turn allows us to analyze the
optimal LVS performance as a function of the Rician K-factor of
the channel between the BS and a legitimate vehicle. Our analysis
also allows us to formally prove that the LVS performance limit
is independent of the properties of the channel between the
BS and the malicious vehicle, provided the malicious vehicle’s
antenna number is above a specified value. We also investigate
how tracking information on a vehicle quantitatively improves
the detection performance of an LVS, showing how optimal
performance is obtained under the assumption of the tracking
length being randomly selected. The work presented here can be
readily extended to multiple BS scenarios, and therefore forms
the foundation for all optimal location authentication schemes
within the context of Rician fading channels. Our study closes
important gaps in the current understanding of LVS performance
within the context of VANETs, and will be of practical value to
certificate revocation schemes within IEEE 1609.2.
Index Terms—Location verification, location spoofing detec-
tion, Rician fading, likelihood ratio test, tracking information.
I. INTRODUCTION
In current wireless networks location-based techniques and
services are now ubiquitous. As a consequence of this, the
verification of location information has attracted considerable
research interest in recent years [1–9]. In many location-based
applications the device (client) obtains its location information
directly (e.g., via GPS), and in such a case the wider network
can only achieve the client’s location through requests to
the client. In such a context, the client can easily spoof or
falsify its claimed location in order to disrupt some net-
work functionalities (e.g., geographic routing protocols [10],
location-based access control protocols [11]). The adverse
effects of location spoofing can be more severe in Vehicular
Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) due to the possibility of life-
threatening accidents. Less critically, a malicious vehicle could
spoof its location in order to seriously disrupt other vehicles
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[12], or to selfishly enhance its own functionality within the
network [13]. The integrity of claimed location in VANETs
is therefore important, and motivates the introduction of a
Location Verification System (LVS) to that scenario. Within
IEEE 1609.2, an LVS will form part of the decision logic in
the revocation of malicious-vehicle certificates (see [14] for a
review of certificate revocation within IEEE 1609.2).
Recently, many location verification protocols for VANETs
have been proposed (e.g., [13, 15–23]). These studies have
proven useful in probing the detection performance of an LVS
given a range of potential VANETs attack scenarios and an
array of VANETs configurations. However, several important
gaps in our knowledge of LVS performances and reliabilities
remain. Among these are, (i) the optimal performance of an
LVS as a function of the wireless channel conditions, and
(ii) the optimal performance of an LVS as a function of the
tracking information on a vehicle. These two open issues are
of particular relevance to the VANETs environment, and the
resolution of them forms the core of the work presented here.
With regard to our first issue, we note that in VANETs
environments Rician channels are anticipated to dominate the
channel characteristics [24, 25]. This fact allows us to specify
more precisely the first question we wish to answer: How does
the optimal detection performance of an LVS quantitatively
depend on the proportion of the LOS (line-of-sight) in a
wireless channel? The proportion of the LOS in a wireless
channel impacts the characteristics of observations obtained
over wireless channels, such as the shadowing variance of
Received Signal Strength (RSS), the estimation error of Time
of Arrival (TOA), and the statistics on Angle of Arrival (AOA)
determinations. The follow-on impact of such effects on LVS
performances is non-trivial. Our approach in addressing this
question will be to first determine the optimal attack strategy
of the malicious vehicle, and to use that in order to conduct
a formal theoretical analysis on the LVS performance. With
regard to our second issue, we pose the specific question:
How does the tracking information on a vehicle quantitatively
improve the detection performance of an LVS? This question is
of practical significance since under some channel conditions
the detection performance of an LVS with a only single
claimed location (no tracking) is unfavorable. We address this
issue by first formally developing the optimal decision rule of
an LVS via a Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) based on the track of
claimed locations and then analyze the detection performance
of an LVS when such tracking information is available.
In order to explicitly answer the above two questions, the
directions and some specific contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows. We first determine the optimal attack
2strategy of a malicious vehicle. To this end, after deriving
the optimal transmit power and the optimal beamformer for
the malicious vehicle at an arbitrary location, we identify the
optimal locations of the malicious vehicle (best locations to
launch an attack). Our analysis indicates that these optimal
locations are determined solely by a single direction (due to
the ability of the malicious vehicle to vary his transmit power
and beamformer). Our analysis also reveals that the detection
performance of an LVS will not be a function of the number
of antennas held by the malicious vehicle once this number
is above a derived bound. We next establish that the optimal
attack direction is that set by the direction from the claimed
location to the BS (Base Station), and show how the malicious
vehicle can perfectly imitate the signals expected from a
legitimate vehicle if the malicious vehicle can find a location
in this optimal direction with non-zero LOS. However, given
a constraint imposed that the true location of the malicious
vehicle should be some minimum distance from its claimed
location, such an optimal attack direction may not be viable.
Considering unlimited resources possessed by the malicious
vehicle (e.g., unlimited number of antennas), the LVS can
determine the actual (now sub-optimal) best attack location
given the constraint. We present how all of these findings
allow us to establish lower bounds (worst-case scenario) on the
detection performance of the LVS. We next extend our analysis
to a tracking version of the LVS where multiple observations
are utilized, showing how an extension of our previous analysis
can lead to a range of similar outcomes, but with improved
detection performance. A key part of the tracking LVS which
allows for these findings is that the number of observations
used for the decision-making process is randomly selected.
Additional constraints on the tracking LVS solutions, imposed
by speed limitations of the malicious vehicle, are presented.
Finally, we present extensions of our analysis that take into
account non-linear antenna arrays, and discuss the detection
performance of the LVS in the presence of colluding attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
details our system model. In Section III, the optimal attack
strategy of the malicious vehicle is determined, based on which
the detection performance of the LVS is analyzed. Section IV
formalizes the optimal decision rule of the LVS when tracking
information of the claimed location is available. In Section V,
we present numerical results to verify our analysis and we
also draw some important insights based on our analysis.
In Section VI, we discuss potential extension directions of
our analysis and the impact of colluding attacks on an LVS.
Finally, Section VII draws concluding remarks.
Notation: Scalar variables are denoted by italic symbols.
Vectors and matrices are denoted by lower-case and upper-
case boldface symbols, respectively. Given a complex number
z, |z| denotes the modulus of z and Re{z} denotes the real part
of z. Given a complex vector x, ‖x‖ denotes the Euclidean
norm, x⊤ denotes the transpose of x, x† denotes the conjugate
transpose of x, and x[i] denotes the i-th element of x. Given
a square matrix X, tr(X) denotes the trace of X and det(X)
denotes the determinant of X. The L × L identity matrix is
referred to as IL and ⌈·⌉ denotes the ceiling function.
Fig. 1. Illustration of the orientations of the three ULAs and the geometry
of the BS, the legitimate vehicle, and the malicious vehicle. We note that N1,
d1(t), θ1(t), and ψ1(t) are not assumed to be known to the LVS.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. System Assumptions
Throughout this work we represent the inputs of an LVS as
binary hypotheses, the null hypothesis H0 and the alternative
hypothesis H1. Under H0 the vehicle is legitimate and pro-
vides to the LVS a claimed location equal to its true location.
Under H1 the vehicle is malicious1 and provides to the LVS
a claimed location which is not its true location (a spoofed
location). We consider a VANETs application scenario, where
the BS, the legitimate vehicle, and the malicious vehicle are
all equipped with uniform linear arrays (ULAs). We discuss
later the impact of non-linear antenna arrays. The number
of antenna elements of the ULAs at the BS, the legitimate
vehicle, and the malicious vehicle are NB , N0, and N1, respec-
tively. Utilizing observations obtained over wireless channels,
the BS is to verify whether the vehicle is indeed at its claimed
location or not, thus inferring whether the vehicle is legitimate
or malicious. In the first instance we will assume the presence
of only one malicious vehicle (we discuss colluding attacks
later).
We adopt the polar coordinate system (dk, θk) in this work
(k ∈ {0, 1}), where d0 (d1) is the distance from the origin
to the center of the legitimate (malicious) vehicle’s ULA, and
θ0 (θ1) represents the angle measured counterclockwise from
the x-axis to the line connecting the center of the legitimate
(malicious) vehicle’s ULA to the origin. The location of the
BS is selected as the origin, and the BS’s ULA is aligned
with the x-axis (antenna elements all on x-axis). A schematic
of our assumed set-up is shown in Fig. 1. The claimed
location of a vehicle (legitimate or malicious) at time slot t
(t = 1, 2, . . . , T ) is denoted as xc(t) = (dc(t), θc(t)), which is
supplied to the LVS and to be verified (note, the LVS may be
embedded in the BS). The true location of the vehicle under
1Note, although we will often refer to the attacker as the malicious vehicle,
we should bear in mind that in reality the attacker may not be a vehicle (e.g.,
could be a generic device/user situated anywhere).
3H0 (the legitimate vehicle’s true location) at t is denoted as
x0(t) = [d0(t), θ0(t)]
⊤
. The true location of the vehicle under
H1 (the malicious vehicle’s true location) at t is denoted as
x1(t) = [d1(t), θ1(t)]
⊤
. Since the legitimate vehicle reports
its true location to the LVS, we have xc(t) = x0(t). We adopt
a practical threat model, in which the distance between the
malicious vehicle’s true location and its claimed location is
larger than some specific value rl (i.e., ‖x1(t)−xc(t)‖ > rl).
We note that this assumption is reasonable since the mali-
cious vehicle does not need to spoof its claimed location
if ‖x1(t) − xc(t)‖ is very small. The value of rl can be
predetermined based on some specific application scenario
and in general it is larger than a vehicle’s intrinsic position
uncertainty. The angles ψ0(t) and ψ1(t) as shown in Fig. 1
are under the control of the legitimate and malicious vehicles,
respectively. We note that ψ0(t) (ψ1(t)) represents the angle
measured counterclockwise from the orientation of the ULA
at the legitimate (malicious) vehicle to the line connecting
the center of the legitimate (malicious) vehicle’s ULA to the
origin. Without other statements, we assume all information
available to the LVS, BS, and legitimate vehicle is also known
to the malicious vehicle. We assume N1, x1(t), and ψ1(t) are
known only by the malicious vehicle. We will assume that N1
is unbounded (of course in practice this number is constrained
by the communication wavelength and the physical dimensions
of the vehicle). If in practice the malicious vehicle possesses
less than a critical number of antenna elements (to be derived
later), then the results presented here represent conservative
lower bounds on the LVS performance.
Note in this work we will consider observations collected
by only one BS. In general, this represents the most likely
(default) scenario for many real-world VANETs. As such,
the analysis we provide here should be widely applicable.
The analysis for the single BS also forms the basis from
which other more complicated scenarios can be built upon.
For example, in instances where additional BSs are within
range of claimed positions, the work presented here can be
readily adapted to account for that.2 A conceptually simple
method of doing this would be for each additional BS to be
allocated a separate LVS which can then cooperate with other
LVSs (BSs) in order to make optimally-joint decisions.
B. Channel Model
We assume the channel from a vehicle (legitimate or mali-
cious) to the BS is subject to Rician fading. Then, the NB×Nk
channel matrix at t under Hk is given by
Hk(t) =
√
Kk(t)
1 +Kk(t)
Hk(t) +
√
1
1 +Kk(t)
H˜k(t), (1)
where Kk(t) is the Rician K-factor of the channel under Hk
(we assume Kk(t) is a function the vehicle’s true location),
Hk(t) is the LOS component of Hk(t), and H˜k(t) is the
2We note that other trusted vehicles within range of the claimed position
could also be used as additional reference stations. Indeed, vehicles which are
considered legitimate (e.g., by consistently passing all LVS decisions over a
length of time) can be used to dynamically create/update the K map for a
particular BS, at least with regard to all locations on the road.
scattered component of Hk(t). The entries of H˜k(t) are inde-
pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) circularly-symmetric
complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit
variance. We assume that H˜k(t) is i.i.d. in different time
slots. Denoting ρB as the space between two adjacent antenna
elements of the ULA at the BS, Hk(t) can be written as
Hk(t) = rk(t)tk(t) [26], where rk(t) and tk(t) are given
by
rk(t) = [1, · · · , exp(j(NB − 1)τB cos θk(t))]⊤ , (2)
tk(t) = [1, · · · , exp(−j(Nk − 1)τk cosψk(t))] . (3)
In (2) and (3), we have τB = 2πfcρB/c and τk = 2πfcρk/c,
where fc is the carrier frequency, c is the speed of propagation
of the plane wave, ρ0 is the space between two antenna
elements of the ULA at the legitimate vehicle, and ρ1 is
the space between two antenna elements of the ULA at the
malicious vehicle. We note that we assume the LVS knows
K0(t) (e.g., through a predetermined measurement campaign
in the vicinity of the BS). We assume K1(t) is known by the
malicious vehicle but not known by the LVS. Note that we will
assume that the time dependence for all our variables arises
solely from the fact that the vehicle is in general moving (i.e.,
the variables are functions of location). The exception to this
is H˜k(t), for which the time dependence is also due to the
movement of scatterers. Our channel model covers the entire
range of conditions from a pure Rayleigh channel (K = 0) to
a pure LOS channel (K =∞).
C. Observation Model
The composite observation model is given by
Hk : y(t)=
√
pk(t)g(dk(t))Hk(t)bk(t)s+nk(t), (4)
where pk(t) is the transmit power of the vehicle under Hk,3
g(dk(t)) is the path loss gain under Hk given by g(dk(t)) =
(c/4πfcdr)
2 (dr/dk(t))
ξ
, dr is a reference distance, ξ is the
path loss exponent, bk(t) is the beamformer adopted by the
vehicle under Hk that satisfies ‖bk(t)‖ = 1, s is the publicly
known pilot symbol satisfying ‖s‖ = 1, and nk(t) is the
additive white Gaussian noise vector at t under Hk, of which
the entries are i.i.d circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian
random variables with zero mean and variance σ2k . We note
that for simplicity we assume that ξ is independent of a
vehicle’s location and is the same for all power components
(i.e., Hk(t) and H˜k(t)) since we have assumed that Kk(t)
is a function of a vehicle’s location [27]. As we show later,
our analysis still holds even if ξ is a function of a vehicle’s
location and is different for Hk(t) and H˜k(t). We assume
that the legitimate vehicle adopts constant transmit power, i.e.,
p0(t) = p0. However, we note that p1(t) varies. This is due to
the fact that the malicious vehicle can adjust its transmit power
based on each pair of x0(t) and x1(t). We also assume that
nk(t) is i.i.d in different time slots. We note that b0(t) and
p0 are under the control of the legitimate vehicle. We assume
3We will be conservative and assume the attacker has unlimited power
resources. If a power constraint (on attacker) is introduced some of the attacks
we describe later may not be possible, and in these circumstances the LVS
performances shown can be considered lower bounds (worst-case scenarios).
4that the legitimate vehicle cooperates with the BS to facilitate
the location verification. To this end, the legitimate vehicle
sets b0(t) = t
†
0(t)/‖t0(t)‖ so as to maximize |t0(t)b0(t)|. In
addition, the legitimate vehicle sets its transmit power to the
required value by the BS (we assume p0 is publicly known).
Again, we assume neither p1(t) nor b1(t) is known to the
LVS. According to (1) and (4), the likelihood function of y(t)
conditioned on a known s under Hk is
f(y(t)|Hk)= 1
πNB det(Rk(t))
×
exp
[−(y(t)−mk(t))†R−1k (t)(y(t)−mk(t))] , (5)
where mk(t) and Rk(t) are the mean vector and covariance
matrix of y(t) under Hk, respectively, which are given by
mk(t) =
√
pk(t)g(dk(t))Kk(t)
1 +Kk(t)
Hk(t)bk(t), (6)
Rk(t) =
(
pk(t)g(dk(t))
1 +Kk(t)
+ σ2k
)
INB . (7)
We note that under H0 we have H0(t)b0(t) =
√
N0r0(t)
due to b0(t) = t†0(t)/‖t0(t)‖. We also note that f(y(t)|H1)
is dependent on p1(t), b1(t), and x1(t). Thus, we also denote
f(y(t)|H1) as f (y|p1(t),b1(t),x1(t),H1). These parameters
(i.e., p1(t), b1(t), and x1(t)) are all under the control of the
malicious vehicle and are unknown to the LVS. In the next
section, we will discuss how the malicious vehicle optimally
sets these parameters in order to minimize the probability of
being detected by the LVS.
III. LOCATION VERIFICATION SYSTEM
WITHOUT TRACKING
In this section we examine the performance of the LVS by
considering only one claimed location and one observation
snapshot at the BS antennas (i.e., BS measurements made in
one time slot, and T = 1). As such, we drop explicit reference
to (t) for all variables in this section. We first present the
decision rule and performance metrics adopted in this LVS.
We then discuss the optimal attack strategy of the malicious
vehicle (i.e., how to optimally set p1, b1, and x1) in order to
minimize the probability to be detected. Finally, we analyze
the detection performance of the LVS based on this optimal
attack strategy.
A. Decision Rule of the LVS
We adopt the LRT as the decision rule of the LVS. This is
due to the fact that the LRT achieves the highest detection rate
(the probability to correctly detect a malicious vehicle) for any
given false positive rate (the probability to incorrectly detect
a legitimate vehicle as malicious) [28]. The LRT decision rule
is given by
Λ (y) ,
f (y|p1,b1,x1,H1)
f (y|H0)
D1≥
<
D0
λ, (8)
where Λ (y) is the likelihood ratio of y, λ is the threshold
for Λ (y), and D0 and D1 are the binary decisions that infer
whether the vehicle is legitimate or malicious, respectively.
Given the decision rule in (8), the false positive and detection
rates of the LVS are functions of λ. Note, the false positive
rate is given by α(λ) = Pr (Λ (y) > λ|H0), and detection
rate is given by β(λ) = Pr (Λ (y) > λ|H1). The specific
value of λ can be set through predetermining a false positive
rate, minimizing the Bayesian average cost, or maximizing
the mutual information between the system input and output
[8]. In order to quantitatively examine the impact of some
system parameters on the detection performance of the LVS,
we have to adopt a unique metric to evaluate the LVS. When it
is necessary, we adopt a special Bayesian average cost as the
unique performance metric, which is the total error. The total
error is obtained by setting the costs of correct and incorrect
decisions as zeros and ones, respectively [29]. The total error
can be expressed as
ǫ(λ) = P0α(λ) + (1− P0)(1 − β(λ)), (9)
where P0 and 1 − P0 are the a priori probabilities that the
vehicle is legitimate and malicious, respectively. Based on the
Bayesian framework, the optimal value of λ that minimizes
ǫ(λ) is given by λ∗ = P0/(1− P0) [29]. Substituting λ∗ into
(9), we can obtain the minimum value of ǫ(λ), referred to as
the minimum total error and denoted by ǫ∗.
B. Optimal Attack Strategy Against the LVS
Knowing (8), the malicious vehicle is to minimize the
difference between f (y|p1,b1,x1,H1) and f (y|H0) in order
to minimize the detection rate. It can be shown that min-
imization of the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence leads to
the minimum detection rate [30]. This is due to that the KL
divergence is also the expected log likelihood ratio when the
alternative hypothesis H1 is true. The KL divergence from
f (y|p1,b1,x1,H1) to f (y|H0) is defined as [31]
DKL (f (y|p1,b1,x1,H1) ||f (y|H0))
=
∫
[ln Λ(y)] f (y|p1,b1,x1,H1) dy. (10)
Given this, the optimization problem for the malicious vehicle
can be written as
(p1,b1,x1)
∗
=
argmax
p1≥0,‖b1‖=1,
‖xc−x1‖≥rl
DKL (f (y|p1,b1,x1,H1) ||f (y|H0)) . (11)
We present the solutions to (11) in two steps. We first derive
the optimal values of p1 and b1 for any given x1 in Theorem 1.
Then, we search for the optimal value of x1 numerically, with
the aid of Theorem 2.
Theorem 1: The optimal values of p1 and b1 that minimize
the detection rate for any given x1 are derived as
p∗1(x1) =
K1 + 1
g(d1)
(
p0g(d0)
1 +K0
+ σ20 − σ21
)
, (12)
b∗1(x1) = U∗p
∗, (13)
where U∗ is the left singular and orthogonal matrix of the
Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) for G†∗G∗, G∗ =√
p∗1(x1)g(d1)K1/(1 +K1) H1, p
∗[1] = U†∗G
†
∗m0[1]/η∗,
5η∗ is the unique eigenvalue of G†∗G∗, and p∗[i] for i =
2, 3, · · · , N1 can be any value which enables ‖p∗‖ = 1,
Proof: Substituting (5) into (10), we have
DKL (f (y|p1,b1,x1,H1) ||f (y|H0))
= tr(R−10 R1)−NB−ln
(
detR1
detR0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
h1(p1)
+ (m0−m1)†R−10 (m0−m1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
h2(p1,b1)
.
(14)
Based on (14), we know that only the term h2 (p1,b1)
is a function of b1. As such, we first derive the optimal
b1 that minimizes h2 (p1,b1) for a given p1. Given the
format of R0 presented in (7), we can see that h2 (p1,b1)
is minimized when ‖m0 − m1‖2 is minimized. Defining
G =
√
p1g(d1)K1/(1 +K1) H1, we have
h3 (b1) , ‖m0 −m1‖2
= b†1G
†Gb1−m†0Gb1−b†1G†m0+m†0m0. (15)
Performing the SVD for the symmetric positive semidefinite
matrix Q , G†G, we have
UVU† = Q. (16)
We note that Q is a rank-1 matrix and we denote the unique
eigenvalue of Q as η. Then, we have
η = ‖Q‖ = p1g(d1)K1NBN1
1 +K1
. (17)
Denoting b1 = Up (i.e., p = U†b1), following (15) and (16)
we have
h3 (b1)=p
†Vp−m†0GUp−p†U†G†m0 +m†0m0. (18)
We note that U†G†m0 is a complex N1 × 1 vector and we
denote the i-th complex element of U†G†m0 as cRi + jcIi.
Since Q is a rank-1 matrix, we have U†G†m0[i] = 0 for
i = 2, 3, · · · , N1. Denoting the i-th complex element of p as
pRi + jpIi, following (18) we have
h3 (b1)=η(p
2
R1+p
2
I1)−2 (cR1pR1+cI1pI1) +m†0m0. (19)
Using (19), we have pR1 = cR1η and pI1 = cI1η in order to
minimize h3 (b1) without any constraints, which results in
po[1] = U†G†m0[1]/η, (20)
where po denotes the optimal p that minimizes h3(p) for a
given p1. We note that there is a constraint for the minimiza-
tion of h3 (b1), which is ‖b1‖ = 1 (i.e., ‖p‖ = 1 since U is a
unitary matrix). As such, we have to guarantee c2R1+c2I1 ≤ η,
which means that we have to guarantee ‖U†G†m0‖/η ≤ 1.
Based on the definitions of G and m0, and noting t1t†1 = N1
we have
‖U†G†m0‖2 = ‖G†m0‖2
=
p0g(d0)K0N0
1 +K0
p1g(d1)K1
1 +K1
r
†
0r1t1t
†
1r
†
1r0
=
p0g(d0)K0N0
1 +K0
p1g(d1)K1N1
1 +K1
|r†1r0|2. (21)
We also note that the maximum value of |r†1r0|2 is N2B , which
is achieved when r1 = r0. Then, as per (17) we have
‖U†G†m0‖
η
≤
√
p0g(d0)K0
1 +K0
√
1 +K1
p1g(d1)K1
√
N0
N1︸ ︷︷ ︸
L(N1)
. (22)
In order to guarantee L(N1) ≤ 1, the malicious vehicle has
to guarantee N1 ≥ N∗1 , where N∗1 is obtained by setting
L(N1) = 1 and is given by
N∗1 =
⌈
max
{
2,
p0g(d0)K0N0
K1[p0g(d0)+(1+K0)(σ20−σ21)]
}⌉
. (23)
The reason for N∗1 ≥ 2 is that the minimum dimension of
p must be 2 if r1 is to remain a function of θ1. We assume
the malicious vehicle can guarantee N1 ≥ N∗1 , and therefore
guarantee ‖U†G†m0‖/η ≤ 1. As such, the optimal solution
po[1] = U†G†m0[1]/η can always be achieved. This optimal
solution indicates that po[i], for i ≥ 2, can take any values in
order to realize ‖po‖ = 1.
We next derive the optimal value of p1. Substituting po[1] =
U†G†m0[1]/η into (18), we have
h3(b
o
1)=m
†
0m0−
‖U†G†m0‖2
η
=
p0g(d0)K0N0
1 +K0
(
NB − |r
†
1r0|2
NB
)
, (24)
where bo1 = Upo. We note that |r†1r0|2 is a function of only
NB , θ0, and θ1. Thus, h3(bo1) is not a function of p1 anymore.
Based on (14), we know that h1(p1) is a function of only p1.
This indicates that the optimal p1 is the one that minimizes
h1(p1). After some algebra, we can show that that h1(p1) is
minimized when R0 = R1, which results in the desirable
result in (12). We note that to achieve (12) we require σ21 <
p0g(d0)/(1+K0)+σ
2
0 . This is reasonable as the channel noise
variance will be lower than the useful signal power. Finally,
substituting p∗1(x1) into (20) we obtain the desirable result in
(13).
We note that if the condition N1 ≥ N∗1 cannot be guaran-
teed, the minimum KL divergence for any given x1 will be
larger than that for N1 ≥ N∗1 . To prove this statement, we
have to prove the following equation
DKL (f (y|p′1(x1),b′1(x1),x1,H1) ||f (y|H0))
≥ DKL (f (y|p∗1(x1),b∗1(x1),x1,H1) ||f (y|H0)) ,
(25)
where p′1(x1) and b′1(x1) denote the optimal values of p1
and b1 under the condition N1 < N∗1 for any given x1.
Following (19), we have h3(b′1(x1)) ≥ h3(b∗1(x1)). This
is due to the fact that b′1(x1) minimizes h3(b1) under the
constraint p2R1 + p2I1 ≤ 1, but b∗1(x1) minimizes h3(b1)
without any constraints. Noting h1(p∗1(x1)) = 0, we have
h1(p
′
1(x1)) ≥ h1(p∗1(x1)). This is due to h1(p1) ≥ 0 for any
values of p1 since the KL divergence is not negative. Then,
we have
h1(p
′
1(x1))+h3(b
′
1(x1))≥h1(p∗1(x1))+h3(b∗1(x1)). (26)
6Since R0 is independent of N1, following (14) we can see
(26) proves (25).
Theorem 2: The optimal value of θ1 that minimizes the
detection rate can be obtained through
θ∗1 = argmax
‖xc−x1‖≥rl
|r†1r0|2. (27)
Proof: Substituting (12) and (13) into (14), we obtain the
minimum value of DKL (f (y|p1,b1,x1,H1) ||f (y|H0)) for
any given x1 as
DKL (f (y|p∗1(x1),b∗1(x1),x1,H1) ||f (y|H0))
=
p0g(d0)K0N0
p0g(d0) + σ20(1 +K0)
(
NB − |r
†
1r0|2
NB
)
. (28)
The malicious vehicle will determine its optimal true location
by finding the value of x1 that minimizes (28). We note that
in (28) only the term |r†1r0|2 is a function of θ1. As such,
the malicious vehicle needs only to maximize |r†1r0|2 in order
find the optimal θ1. As such, we obtain (27).
Based on Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 we obtain the following
important insights. (i) We note that once N1 = N∗1 , further
increases in N1 offer no further benefit to the malicious
vehicle. That is, the additional degrees of freedom offered
by additional antennas beyond N∗1 serve no purpose (in the
beamformer solution the malicious vehicle can set power
allocated to these additional antennas - if it has them - to zero).
(ii) We can see that the minimum KL divergence presented in
(28) increases as p0, g(d0), K0, or N0 increases. (iii) We note
that the minimum KL divergence presented in (28) is zero
when K0 = 0, and thus the malicious vehicle can always
perfectly imitate the legitimate vehicle (again this issue that
could be neutralized by using additional BSs). (iv) We note
that the minimum KL divergence provided in (28) is not a
function of K1 or σ21 . However, we highlight that as K1 → 0,
N∗1 →∞, meaning K1 = 0 represents the worst case for the
malicious vehicle. (v) Based on Theorem 2 we note that θ∗1 is
a function of only r0 (i.e., only depends on NB and θ0). This
indicates that the malicious vehicle can directly search for its
true location as per Theorem 2, no need to calculate p∗1(x1) or
b∗1(x1) for each x1. (vi) We also note that θ∗1 is not a function
of K1 or σ21 (except that θ∗1 not defined for K1 = 0). This
demonstrates that the optimal true location of the malicious
vehicle does not depend on the inherent properties of the
malicious channel (the channel between the malicious vehicle
and the BS). (vii) Following Theorem 2, we note that there is
no unique solution to the optimal true location of the malicious
vehicle since (28) does not depend on d1. This is due to the
fact that the malicious vehicle can adjust its transmit power to
counteract the change of d1 (i.e., p∗1(x1) is a function of d1).
Following (2), we have
|r†1r0|2 =

N2B, cos θ0 = cos θ1,(
sin( 12NBνθ)
sin( 12νθ)
)2
, cos θ0 6= cos θ1, (29)
where νθ = τB(cos θ0−cos θ1). To gain some further insights,
we plot |r†1r0|2 and NB−|r†1r0|2/NB versus θ1/π in Fig. 2. In
Fig. 2 (a), we first observe that the optimal attack is indeed at
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Fig. 2. |r†
1
r0|2 and NB −|r†1r0|2/NB versus θ1/pi for different values of
NB and θ0, where τB = pi.
θ∗1 = ±θ0 (i.e., θ∗1 = ±θc due to θc = θ0). Following (29), we
note that the minimum KL divergence presented in (28) is zero
for θ∗1 = ±θc. This indicates that the malicious vehicle can
perfectly imitate the signals expected from a legitimate vehicle
at xc if the malicious vehicle can set θ∗1 = ±θc.4 In Fig. 2 (b)
we also observe this effect, but this figure also illustrates that if
θ∗1 = ±θc was not possible (as was the case in this simulation
in which the malicious vehicle could not access this angle due
to the presence of a non-accessible area) then |r†1r0|2 does not
necessarily increase as θ1 approaches θ0. This is due to the
fact that θ1 minimizes |r†1r0|2 at arccos
(
cos θ0 +
2napi
NBτa
)
for
na = 1, . . . , NB − 1. Comparing Fig. 2 (c) with Fig. 2 (d),
we can see that NB − |r†1r0|2/NB increases for the larger
NB case. This is consistent with the general rule that the
minimum KL divergence presented in (28) increases as NB
increases, and thus indicates that the detection performance of
the LVS increases as the number of antenna elements at the
BS increases.
This above discussion also illustrates the very important role
played by the constraint ‖xc − x1‖ ≥ rl in (27) in limiting
any attack. For example, if a claimed location is within rl to
the BS, and a building is between the claimed location and
the malicious vehicle, then no LOS component to the BS at
the angle θ∗1 = ±θc is available to the malicious vehicle. Its
actual optimal (now sub-optimal) attack location is then set
at another angle. Assuming the malicious vehicle can always
access a θ∗1 = ±θc location, with a non-zero LOS component
to the BS, is therefore the most conservative scenario (worst-
case scenario from the LVS perspective).
4If additional BSs are in range of the claimed location this form of perfect
attack can be neutralized. However, even in the one BS scenario (as we discuss
later), when tracking is brought to bear on this issue this type of attack can
minimized and even completely neutralized if constraints on the threat model
are assumed (e.g., if the attacker is assumed to be another vehicle physically
on the same highway as the legitimate vehicle).
7C. Detection Performance of the LVS
Without loss of generality, we first analyze the detection
performance of the LVS based on any given θ1. Based on
the proof of Theorem 1, we know that R1 = R0 when the
malicious vehicle sets p1 = p∗1(x1). Substituting (5), (12), and
(13) into (8), the LRT decision rule presented in (8) can be
written as
T(y)
D1≥
<
D0
Γ, (30)
where T(y) is the test statistic given by
T(y) = 2Re{[m∗1(θ1)−m0]†R−10 y}, (31)
Γ is the threshold for T(y) given by
Γ=lnλ+ Re{[m∗1(θ1)−m0]†R−10 [m∗1(θ1)+m0]}, (32)
and m∗1(θ1) is obtained by substituting (12) and (13) into (6),
and is given by
m∗1(θ1) =
√
p0g(d0)K0N0
1 +K0
r1r
†
1r0
NB
. (33)
Next, we derive the false positive rate, α(λ, θ1), and the
detection rate, β(λ, θ1), of the LVS for any given θ1 in the
following theorem.
Theorem 3: The false positive and detection rates of the
LVS with p1 = p∗1(x1) and b1 = b∗1(x1) for any given θ1 are
derived as
α(λ, θ1) =
{
α˜(λ, θ1), θ1 6= ±θc,
1A(−Γ) = 1A(− lnλ), θ1 = ±θc, (34)
β(λ, θ1) =
{
β˜(λ, θ1), θ1 6= ±θc,
1A(Γ) = 1A(ln λ), θ1 = ±θc, (35)
where
α˜(λ, θ1) = Q
 Γ− 2Re{[m∗1(θ1)−m0]†R−10 m0}√
2[m∗1(θ1)−m0]†R−10 [m∗1(θ1)−m0]

= Q
{
lnλ+D(θ1)√
2D(θ1)
}
, (36)
β˜(λ, θ1) = Q
Γ− 2Re{[m∗1(θ1)−m0]†R−10 m∗1(θ1)}√
2[m∗1(θ1)−m0]†R−10 [m∗1(θ1)−m0]

= Q
{
lnλ−D(θ1)√
2D(θ1)
}
, (37)
Q(x) = 1√
2pi
∫∞
x
exp
(
− t22
)
dt, D(θ1) is the minimum KL
divergence for any θ1 given by (following (28))
D(θ1) = [m
∗
1(θ1)−m0]†R−10 [m∗1(θ1)−m0]
=
p0g(d0)K0N0
p0g(d0) + σ20(1 +K0)
(
NB − |r
†
1r0|2
NB
)
, (38)
and 1A(x) is a indicator function defined by
1A(x) =
{
1, x ≥ 0,
0, x < 0.
(39)
Proof: Following (31), we derive the distributions of the
test statistic T(y) for θ1 6= ±θc under H0 and H1 as follows
T(y)|H0 ∼ N
(
2Re{[m1(θ1)−m0]†R−10 m0},
2[m∗1(θ1)−m0]†R−10 [m∗1(θ1)−m0]
)
, (40)
T(y)|H1 ∼ N
(
2Re{[m1(θ1)−m0]†R−10 m1(θ1)},
2[m∗1(θ1)−m0]†R−10 [m∗1(θ1)−m0]
)
. (41)
Based on the decision rule in (30) and the definitions of the
false positive and detection rates, we obtain the false positive
and detection rates for θ1 6= ±θc in (36) and (37) after some
algebraic manipulations. For θ1 = ±θc, following (31) and
(32) we have T(y) = 0 and Γ = lnλ. Then, based on the
decision rule presented in (30) we obtain the desirable results
for θ1 = ±θc as detailed in (34) and (35). This completes the
proof of Theorem 3.
We note that both α(λ, θ1) and β(λ, θ1) are functions of
D(θ1), which is the minimum KL divergence for a given
θ1 presented in (28). Based on the properties of Q(x) and
the expressions for α(λ, θ1) and β(λ, θ1), we know that
the detection performance of the LVS increases as D(θ1)
increases (e.g., for a given α(λ, θ1), β(λ, θ1) increases as
D(θ1) increases). This confirms that the malicious vehicle
is to search for x∗1 through minimizing the minimum KL
divergence presented in (28). By setting λ = λ∗, following (9)
the minimum total error conditioned on a θ1 can be expressed
as [29]
ǫ∗(θ1) = P0α(λ∗, θ1) + (1− P0) (1− β(λ∗, θ1)) . (42)
We note that the detection performance of the LVS based on
the malicious vehicle’s optimal true location can be obtained
by substituting θ∗1 into our derived α(λ, θ1) and β(λ, θ1).
In summarizing this section we note the following. The
analysis given above provides the optimal decision framework
for the LVS, and provides analytical solutions for the detection
performance of the LVS as a function of the Rician K-
factors. The performance analysis given is valid for scenarios
in which the optimal θ1 value is forbidden to the malicious
vehicle. The closest work to the results of this section are
perhaps those detailed in [23]. However, in [23], due to the
assumption of a severely restrictive threat model in which the
malicious vehicle must be on the same road as the legitimate
vehicle, the allowed attack scenarios are severely constrained
and far from optimal (e.g., θ1’s allowed are small). Also,
for simplicity, the beamformer in [23] is set using a single
parameter, which means it does not possess independently-
set antenna coefficients. Such a simple beamformer provides
poorer performance (relative to the solutions presented here)
when an attack from a non-optimal location is launched.
IV. LOCATION VERIFICATION SYSTEM
WITH TRACKING
In this section we examine the LVS when tracking informa-
tion on the claimed location is available. That is, when claimed
8locations and BS measurements are available at multiple
(sequential) time slots (T ≥ 2). We refer to this LVS as the
tracking LVS. We first present the decision rule adopted in this
tracking LVS, and then present the optimal attack strategy of
the malicious vehicle against the tracking LVS. Finally, we
analyze the detection performance of the tracking LVS based
on this optimal attack strategy.
A. Decision Rule of the Tracking LVS
In the tracking LVS we assume that we collect one y(t)
for each claimed location xc(t). There are several questions
we could pose given the introduction of tracking information
to the LVS. However, perhaps the most pragmatic question
for a tracking LVS is how to make an optimal decision (e.g.,
minimize the total error) on whether the vehicle is legitimate
or malicious given the last sequence of observations at its
disposal. An important system-model issue in tracking mode
is that we will let the tracking LVS randomly select the number
of time slots to be used prior to each LVS decision. That is,
once a decision is made based on say Ta time slots, the next
decision is made independently based on the next say Tb time
slots, where Ta and Tb are specific realizations of the random
variable T . Operationally, this means the specific realizations
of T will always be unknown to the malicious vehicle.5
Henceforth, when we use T we will mean a realization of
the random variable T . Under such conditions the optimal
decision rule (per decision) for the tracking LVS will be an
expanded version of our previously utilized LRT, namely,
Λtrack (Y(T ))
D1≥
<
D0
λtrack, (43)
where Y(T ) = [y(1), · · · ,y(T )], Λtrack (Y(T )) is the like-
lihood ratio of Y(T ) given by
Λtrack (Y(T )) =
f (Y(T )|p1(T ),B1(T ),X1(T ),H1)
f (Y(T )|H0) ,
(44)
p1(T ) = [p1(1), · · · , p1(T )], B1(T ) = [b1(1), · · · ,b1(T )],
X1(T ) = [x1(1), · · · ,x1(T )], and λtrack is the threshold for
Λtrack (Y(T )). Since y(t) are independent for different t, we
further have
Λtrack (Y(T )) =
∏T
t=1 f (y(t)|p1(t),b1(t),x1(t),H1)∏T
t=1 f (y(t)|H0)
.
(45)
Again, the false positive rate of the tracking LVS is given by
αtrack(λtrack) = Pr (Λtrack (Y(T )) > λtrack|H0), and the
detection rate of the tracking LVS is given by βtrack(λtrack) =
Pr (Λtrack (Y(T )) > λtrack|H1). The specific value of λtrack
can be set based on a methodology similar to that used
in setting λ. We again adopt the total error as the unique
performance metric to evaluate the tracking LVS. The optimal
5The (non-tracking) LVS discussed earlier is now seen as a special case
of the tracking LVS with the realization of T always set equal to one and
without the additional constraint ru. Note, due to the additional constraint
ru, the tracking solution in general is not identical to a solution derived from
the direct use of individual unit (T = 1) timeslot decisions.
value of λtrack that minimizes the total error of the tracking
LVS is given by λ∗track = P0/(1− P0) [29].
B. Optimal Attack Strategy Against the Tracking LVS
Knowing (43), in order to minimize the detection rate, the
malicious vehicle is to minimize the following KL divergence
[30]
DKL (f (Y(T )|p1(T ),B1(T ),X1(T ),H1) ||
f (Y(T )|H0))
=
∫
[ln Λtrack(Y(T ))]×
f (Y(T )|p1(T ),B1(T ),X1(T ),H1) dY(T )
=
∫ [ T∑
t=1
ln Λ(y(t))
]
T∏
t=1
f (y(t)|p1(t),b1(t),x1(t),H1)
× dY(T )
=
T∑
t=1
DKL (f (y(t)|p1(t),b1(t),x1(t),H1) ||f (y(t)|H0)) .
(46)
Based on (46), we know that the KL divergence for t =
1, 2, · · · , T is the sum of the KL divergence presented in
(10) for each t. We also can see that the KL divergence at
t is independent of the system settings at other time slots.
This indicates that the malicious vehicle can optimize all the
parameters under his control at t (e.g., p1(t), b1(t), and x1(t))
by considering only the system settings for the current time
slot t (e.g., the values of xc(t), σ20(t), and σ21(t)). As such,
the optimal attack strategy for the malicious vehicle is to
optimize all parameters under its control for the current time
slot. To this end, for each t the malicious vehicle first optimizes
p1(t) and b1(t) according to Theorem 1 for any given x1(t).
Then, the malicious vehicle is to optimize x1(t) under some
constraints detailed in the following. For xc(1), the malicious
vehicle can optimize x1(t) according to Theorem 2. We would
like to highlight that in addition to |xc(t) − x1(t)| ≥ rl
there is another constraint on x1(t) for t ≥ 2, which is that
|x∗1(t−1)−x1(t)| ≤ ru, where ru can be determined through
imposition of a realistic vehicle speed limitation. This is due
to the fact that the malicious vehicle cannot move too far away
from its previous location (i.e., its location in the previous time
slot). Then, the optimal θ1(t) for t ≥ 2 is given by
θ∗1(t) = argmax
‖xc(t)−x1(t)‖≥rl,
‖x∗
1
(t−1)−x1(t)‖≤ru
|r†1(t)r0(t)|2. (47)
We note that the optimal attack strategy against the tracking
LVS for the malicious vehicle is to find an angle θ∗1(t) =
±θc(t) with a non-zero LOS component towards the BS for
every time slot. Should the two distance constraints imposed
on the malicious vehicle make θ∗1(t) = ±θc(t) impossible,
then a sub-optimal attack at θ∗1(t) 6= ±θc(t) must take place
at some of the time slots.
9C. Detection Performance of the Tracking LVS
Without loss of generality, we analyze the detection per-
formance of the tracking LVS for any given θ1(T ) =
[θ1(1), · · · , θ1(T )] by considering p1(t) = p∗1(x1(t)) and
b1(t) = b
∗
1(x1(t)). We denote the track of claimed locations
as θc(T ) = [θc(1), · · · , θc(T )]. Following (45), the LRT
decision rule presented in (43) can be rewritten as
Ttrack(Y(T ))
D1≥
<
D0
Γtrack, (48)
where Ttrack(Y(T )) is the test statistic given by
Ttrack(Y(T )) = 2Re
{
T∑
t=1
[m∗1(θ1(t))−m0(t)]†R−10 y(t)
}
,
(49)
and Γtrack is the threshold for Ttrack(Y(T )) given by
Γtrack=lnλtrack+
Re
{
T∑
t=1
[m∗1(θ1(t))−m0(t)]†R−10 [m∗1(θ1(t))+m0(t)]
}
.
(50)
We then derive the false positive rate, αtrack(λtrack, θ1(T )),
and the detection rate, βtrack(λtrack, θ1(T )), of the tracking
LVS for any given θ1(T ) in the following theorem.
Theorem 4: The false positive rate and the detection rate
of the tracking LVS for any given θ1(T ) are derived as
αtrack(λtrack, θ1(T ))
=
{
α˜track(λtrack, θ1(T )), θ1(T ) 6= ±θc(T ),
1A(− lnλtrack), θ1(T ) = ±θc(T ), (51)
βtrack(λtrack, θ1(T ))
=
{
β˜track(λtrack, θ1(T )), θ1(T ) 6= ±θc(T ),
1A(lnλtrack), θ1(T ) = ±θc(T ), (52)
where
α˜track(λtrack, θ1(T ))=Q
{
lnλtrack +Dtrack(θ1(T ))√
2Dtrack(θ1(T ))
}
,
(53)
β˜track(λtrack, θ1(T ))=Q
{
lnλtrack −Dtrack(θ1(T ))√
2Dtrack(θ1(T ))
}
,
(54)
and Dtrack(θ1(T )) is the minimum KL divergence for any
given θ1(T ), which is given by (following (28) and (46))
Dtrack(θ1(T ))
=
T∑
t=1
DKL (f (y(t)|p∗1(t),b∗1(t),x1(t),H1) ||f (y(t)|H0))
=
T∑
t=1
p0g(d0(t))K0(t)N0
p0g(d0(t))+σ20(t)(1+K0(t))
(
NB− |r1(t)
†r0(t)|2
NB
)
.
(55)
Proof: The proof of Theorem 4 is very similar to that of
Theorem 3, we therefore omit it here.
The minimum total error of the tracking LVS for any given
θ1(T ) is [29]
ǫ∗track(θ1(T )) = P0αtrack(λ
∗
track, θ1(T ))
+ (1 − P0) (1− βtrack(λ∗track, θ1(T ))) .
(56)
We note that the minimum KL divergence provided in (28) is
greater than zero for any x1(t) as long as θ1(t) 6= ±θc(t). As
such, Dtrack(θ1(T )) monotonically increases as T increases
for θ1(t) 6= ±θc(t). This demonstrates that the detection
performance of the tracking LVS increases as T increases as
long as θ1(t) 6= ±θc(t) (e.g., ǫ∗track(θ1(T )) decreases as T
increases).
In summarizing this section we note the following. The
above analysis on the tracking LVS makes the following key
points. Under the assumption that T is randomly selected per
decision by the tracking LVS, the optimal decision framework
is a reasonably extension of the non-tracking framework.
The optimal attack scenario is for the malicious vehicle to
be at θ∗1(t) = ±θc(t). However, physical constraints (such
as limited speed) may make this impossible. The next sub-
optimal malicious vehicle location can then be calculated -
and this location may not necessarily be the θ1(t) closest to
θ0(t) with non-zero LOS components. The performance of the
tracking LVS under any potential sequence of the malicious
vehicle’s locations is provided analytically. The closest work to
the analysis presented in this section is perhaps [16], in which
a wireless intrusion detection system based on the utilization of
position tracking and the localization error bounds of Extended
Kalman Filters is developed. It is shown in [16] that the
detection errors of the system with tracking information can
be an order of magnitude smaller relative to that of the
system with only a static location. However, the optimality
of the location spoofing detection system with tracking was
not discussed in [16].
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical simulations to verify
the accuracy of our provided analysis on the LVS and the
tracking LVS. We also provide some useful insights on the
impact of p0, θ∗1 , NB , N0, and K0 on the detection perfor-
mance of the LVS. We further examine the impact of K1 and
σ21 on N
∗
1 .
A. Numerical Results for the LVS
We first consider the LVS (i.e., the non-tracking LVS) and
thus we drop the index (t) in this subsection. In Fig. 3, we
present the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve
of the LVS. In this figure, we first observe that the Monte
Carlo simulations precisely match the theoretic results, which
confirms our analysis presented in Theorem 3. We also observe
that the ROC curves for p0g(d0)/σ20 = 5dB dominate the ROC
curves for p0g(d0)/σ20 = 0dB. This observation demonstrates
that the detection performance of the LVS increases as the
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the legitimate channel (the
channel between the BS and the legitimate vehicle) increases.
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As expected, we further observe that the ROC curve shifts
towards the right-lower corner as θ∗1 moves closer to θ0.
In Fig. 4, we present the minimum total error ǫ(θ∗1) versus
the number of antenna elements at the legitimate vehicle (N0)
and the number of antenna elements at the BS (NB). As
expected, we first observe that ǫ(θ∗1) decreases as NB or N0
increases. We also observe that ǫ(θ∗1) decreases as the Rician
K-factor of the legitimate channel (K0) increases. From the
simulations to obtain Fig. 4, we confirm N∗1 increases as N0
or K0 increases, but is not a function of NB .
In Fig. 5, we plot N∗1 versus Rician K-factor of the
malicious channel, K1, and the noise variance of the malicious
channel, σ21 . As expected from (23), we first observe that N∗1
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1
versus K1 and σ21 for N0 = 3, p0g(d0) = −75dB, σ20 =
−85dB, and K0 = 0dB.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
T
D
et
ec
ti
o
n
ra
te
,
F
a
ls
e
p
o
si
ti
v
e
ra
te
,
M
in
im
u
m
to
ta
l
er
ro
r
 
 
Detection rate
Minimum total error
False positive rate
Fig. 6. False positive rate, detection rate, and minimum total error of the
tracking LVS versus T for P0 = 0.6, NB = 3, N0 = 2, N1 ≥ N∗1 ,
p0 = 30dB, K0 = −10dB, ξ = 3, c = 3 × 108m/s, f0 = 5.9GHz,
rl = 100m, ru = 3m, τB = pi, and x1(t) = x∗1(t).
increases as K1 decreases or σ21 increases. This demonstrates
that N∗1 is highly dependent on the inherent properties of the
malicious channel. We also observe that N∗1 is a reasonable
value (e.g., 15) even when K1 is small (e.g., −5dB).
B. Numerical Results for the Tracking LVS
In Fig. 6, we examine the impact of T on the detection
performance of the tracking LVS. In the simulations to obtain
Fig. 6, we have assumed the claimed location x0(t) is moving
towards the BS along a straight line with a constant velocity
20km/h and x0(1) = [10
√
2, π/4]. We have also assumed that
x1(t) is on the straight line and K0 is a constant for all x0(t).
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These settings mimic a practical VANETs scenario, where the
BS is on the roadside, the legitimate vehicle is moving along
the road towards the BS, and the malicious vehicle is also
on the same road. The observation frequency and claimed-
location reception are both set at 10 Hz (10 time slots per
second). Other parameters adopted are specified in the caption
of Fig. 6. As expected, we observe that the false positive rate
and the minimum total error decreases as T increases and the
detection rate increases as T increases. With the aid of the
derived false positive and detection rates provided in (51) and
(52), we can quantify the detection performance improvement
brought by increased T . For example, the minimum total error
for T = 10 is only about 30% of that for T = 1.
Finally, in this section we note the effect some of our
channel and system model assumptions have on our results.
More specifically, we probe circumstances where non-zero
errors on the claimed location are present (inclusion of lo-
cation errors also probes the impact of other issues such as
inaccuracies in the K map and potential shadowing effects).
In general, we find such real-world effects have a limited
impact on our results. For example, for the localization error
(average distance between the estimated positions and the real
positions) of 5 meters we find the results of Fig. 6 are impacted
only at the 10% level (e.g., the false positive rate for this
localization error is about 10% higher than that for the zero
localization error).
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Other Antenna Arrays
Although we assumed that the malicious vehicle is equipped
with a ULA, our main analysis provided in this work still
holds if the ULA is replaced by other antenna arrays (e.g.,
non-uniform linear arrays, circular arrays, rectangle arrays). If
the malicious vehicle is equipped with other antenna arrays,
only (3) under H1 will be modified. For example, if the ULA
at the malicious vehicle in Fig. 1 is replaced by a Uniform
Circular Array (UCA) centered at the malicious vehicle, (3)
underH1 will be replaced by the following equation (dropping
the index t) [32]
t1 = [exp(−jτc1 cosφ1),· · ·, exp(−jτc1 cosφN1)] , (57)
where τc1 = 2πfca1/c, a1 is the radius of the UCA at the
malicious vehicle, and φm = 2π(m − 1)/N1 + φ1 (where
m = 1, 2, · · · , N1) is the angle measured counterclockwise
from the reference line (the line connecting the center of the
malicious vehicle’s UCA and the center of the ULA at the
BS) to the m-th antenna element of the UCA. Based on (57)
and H1 = r1t1 we can see that H1 still only contains the
directional information of the malicious channel (i.e., H1 only
depends on θ1 and φ1). Noting Q ∝ H†1H1, we know that the
matrix Q involved in Theorem 1 is still a rank-1 matrix due
to r†krk = NB . In addition, as we have shown in Theorem 3
the detection performance of the LVS is not a function of t1
as long as the malicious vehicle adopts the optimal transmit
power and beamformer. As such, all the analysis provided
earlier still holds exactly for the case where the malicious
vehicle is equipped with the UCA. That is, the use of a UCA
provides the attacker no additional benefit. Finally, we note our
analysis can be readily adapted to cases where antenna arrays
under the control of the LVS (e.g., at the BS and legitimate
vehicle) are also non-linear arrays.
B. Colluding Attacks
We note that in practice the malicious vehicle may launch
colluding attacks to the LVS and the tracking LVS by co-
operating with other malicious vehicles. However, colluding
attacks of any form cannot bring any additional benefits to the
malicious vehicle that can set θ∗1(t) = ±θc(t) at every decision
step. This is because the minimum KL divergence presented
in (28) will always be zero when θ∗1(t) = ±θc(t). This is the
case for both the (non-tracking) LVS and the tracking LVS.
Considering the case where θ∗1(t) 6= ±θc(t), there are
two general specific attack strategies that can adopted by
the colluding malicious vehicles, single-transmission attacks
and multiple-transmission attacks. In the single-transmission
attack only one of the colluding malicious vehicles is ac-
tive and transmitting signals. As such, the collusion in this
type of attack takes the form of information-sharing and
the subsequent decision of which vehicle is in the optimal
location to launch an attack. The single-transmission attack
can help a malicious vehicle against the tracking LVS (but
not the non-tracking LVS). This is because the colluding
malicious vehicles can potentially cooperatively select their
true locations over different time slots in order to avoid the
second constraint in (47), i.e. ‖x∗1(t − 1) − x1(t)‖ ≤ ru.
As the number of colluding malicious vehicles approach
infinity, this constraint can be removed from (47) entirely. In
the multiple-transmission attack, all the colluding malicious
vehicles are active and transmitting signals simultaneously.
As such, the collusion takes the form of information-sharing
and the subsequent decisions on the optimal transmit power,
beamformer, and locations of the colluding malicious vehicles.
Obviously such a sophisticated attack could outperform the
single transmission attack in the general scenario. But again
we stress that when θ∗1(t) = ±θc(t) is allowed none of these
colluding attacks are of importance. As such, adopting the
detection rates for θ∗1(t) = ±θc(t) always provides a worst-
case bound for the LVS and the tracking LVS.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work we have proposed a generic LVS framework
for multi-antenna communication systems, and conducted a
detailed analysis of the framework’s location authentication
performance. Although our work is general and can cover
many application scenarios, we have focussed here on the
emerging VANETs paradigm under the assumption of Rician
channels. Such channels are anticipated to dominate real-
world VANETs communication conditions. The LVS solution
we have proposed is very general and provides a founda-
tion for all optimal location authentication schemes in the
VANET scenario. Taking as inputs a claimed location and
raw observations across the receiving BS antennas, our LVS
checks its knowledge of the Rician channel conditions in
its vicinity, forms a view as to the optimal attack location
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(from the attacker’s viewpoint), and then outputs a binary
decision on whether a vehicle is providing a legitimate lo-
cation. Our analysis quantifies the dependence between the
detection performance limit of the LVS and the Rician K-
factor of the legitimate channel, and formally reveals that
the LVS performance limit is independent of the properties
of the malicious channel. In addition, our analysis discloses
that once the malicious vehicle’s number of antennas reaches
a derived bound, further increases in this number does not
reduce the detection rate. We also formalized the optimal
decision rule when tracking information is added to the LVS.
The work presented here will be of importance to emerging
intelligent vehicular network scenarios, particularly in relation
to certificate revocation schemes within IEEE 1609.2.
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